We show how the generation of a random integer k modulo q and the subsequent computation of k -1 mod q during the signature phase of the NIST digital signature algorithm (DSA) can be replaced by the simultaneous generation of a pair (k, k -1 mod q). The k generated by our method behaves as an unpredictable integer modulo q that cannot, as far as we know, be efficiently distinguished from a truly randomly generated one. Our approach is useful for memory-bound implementations of DSA, because it avoids modular inversion of large integers. It is different from the inversion-free but non-standard method from [10], thus avoiding possible patent issues and incompatibility with standard DSA signature verification implementations. Another application of our method is in the 'blinding' operation that was proposed by Ron Rivest to foil Paul Kocher's timing attack on RSA, or in any other situation where one needs a random number and its modular inverse.
Introduction
Each user of the NIST digital signature algorithm (DSA) has a public key (p, q, g, y) and a corresponding secret key x. Here p is a (512 + i -64)-bit prime for some i E {0,1,...,8}, g E (Z/pZ)* is an element of order q for a 160-bit prime divisor q of p-1, and y E (Z/pZ)* and x E {1,2,... ,q-1} are such that y = g~ (cf. [11] ). Powers of g are represented in the usual way by integers in {1,2,...,p-1}. The signature of a message m consists of a pair (r, s) such that r --t mod q with t = gk E (Z/pZ)* and s -(H(m) + xr)/k mod q for a randomly chosen k E {1, 2,..., q-l} and a 160-bit hash H(m) E Z of the message m. It is required that k be chosen such that s ~ 0 mod q. Both r and s must be represented by integers in {1,2,..., q -1}. To verify a signature (r, s) for a message rn, the verifier computes u -H(m)/s mod q, v =-r/s mod q, and w = g~yV E (Z/pZ)*, and accepts the signature if r --w rood q.
The computationally most intensive part of the signature and verification phases of DSA are the 'modular exponentiations' modulo the fixed modulus p: one modular exponentiation during the signature generation to compute t, and two during the verification 1 to compute w. Furthermore, there are a few modular multiplications modulo the fixed modulus q, and one inversion modulo q in the signature and verification phase each.
In this note we restrict ourselves to the computation that has to be carried out by the signer. We assume that the signer is computationally weak. Our purpose is to implement the signature phase of DSA in a time and memory efficient fashion. In particular we consider the computation of k -1 mod q for a randomly selected k. Notice that the secret key x can be computed if k is exposed for any signature, or if the same k is used more than once by the same signer.
In a DSA implementation where modular arithmetic is implemented using standard arithmetic (i.e., first the product is computed and next its remainder modulo the modulus), it should be possible to implement the extended Euclidean algorithm with little extra overhead---either in software or on-chip, and possibly with inclusion of 'Lehmer's trick ' (cf. [5: 4.5 .2J--throughout this note we refer to this method as 'Lehmer's inversion'). This would make it possible to compute k -1 mod q at a very small fraction of the cost of a modular exponentiation with modulus p, using only a few divisions on integers of at most 160 bits.
Many implementations of cryptographic protocols, however, do not use standard arithmetic but Montgomery arithmetic. If the modulus is fixed, this allows division-free modular multiplication and exponentiation [9] . Compared to regular modular arithmetic it is often faster and implementations require less code. Montgomery arithmetic does, however, not offer a convenient way to directly implement Lehmer's inversion. Nevertheless, since (1.1) k -1 _= k q-2 mod q, Montgomery arithmetic can, in principle, also be used for the computation of k -1 mod q in cases where, as in DSA, the modulus q is prime. Thus, if only Montgomery arithmetic is available, k -1 mod q can be computed at about 1/40th to 1/10th (depending on the relative sizes ofp and q) of the cost of a modular exponentiation with modulus p and with hardly any memory overhead. Although this is reasonably fast, it is considerably slower than Lehmer's inversion. A faster solution was proposed in [10]: replace the signature (r, s) by the triple (r,a,b) with a = (Him) + xr) 9 dmod q and b = k 9 dmod q for some randomly chosen d E {1, 2,..., q-1}, thus avoiding computation of any modular inverses by the signer. The verifier can then compute 1/s mod q as b/a mod q. So, both in the original DSA and in this variation the verifier has to carry out one inversion modulo q. Despite its simplicity and elegance this method has three disadvantages. In the first place, the protocol is slightly different from the standard DSA protocol, which might cause incompatibilities with verifiers that follow the standard. In the second place, this method requires twice the number of random bits required by standard DSA. Whether or not these two
